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We show that, when school quality is measured by the educational standard and attaining the 
standard requires costly effort, secondary education needs not be a hierarchy with private 
schools offering better quality than public schools, as in Epple and Romano, 1998. An 
alternative configuration, with public schools offering a higher educational standard than 
private schools, is also possible, in spite of the fact that tuition levied by private schools is 
strictly positive. In our model, private schools can offer a lower educational standard at a 
positive price because they attract students with a relatively high cost of effort, who would 
find the high standards of the public school excessively demanding. With the key parameters 
calibrated on the available micro-econometric evidence from the US, our model predicts that 
majority voting in the US supports a system with high quality private schools and low quality 
public schools, as assumed by Epple and Romano, 1998. This system, however, is not the one 
that would be selected by the social planner, who prefers high quality public schools 
combined with low quality private schools. 
JEL Code: J24, H42. 
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Do private schools always provide better service than public schools? The an-
swer is apparently straightforward: since private schools charge a positive price
(tuition), they can only attract students by providing better service than public
schools, which are funded by the taxpayer (see De Fraja, 2004). Yet quality is
not the only service that private schools can provide. In a recent scandal, Italian
prosecutors have found that some private schools in the country used to sell high
school diplomas at a price. The so called "Diploma no problem" organization
provided "good service" to its customers: answers were supplied in advance for
written and oral exams, and attendance records were ￿xed. The national exam
for the leaving high school certi￿cate was also by-passed by having customers
take the exams in places where the outcome was assured (The Economist, June
12th, 2004, p.31).
In this admittedly extreme example, private schools can charge a fee by
allowing customers to grab the degree with little e⁄ort: the service o⁄ered is
not quality but leisure. Less extreme perhaps is the evidence discussed by Figlio
and Stone, 1997, that religious private schools in the US provide lower quality in
mathematics and science than public schools. In contrast, non-religious private
schools are found to o⁄er in these ￿elds higher quality than public schools. Their
evidence suggests that private schools are heterogeneous, with some o⁄ering
poorer academic quality and some others o⁄ering better quality than public
schools. Why do US households pay to sent their o⁄spring to school of lower
academic quality? Figlio and Stone argue that parents who enrol their o⁄spring
in private schools may care for other outcomes, such as discipline, extracurricular
activities, religious matters and the opportunity to interact with a certain peer
group1.
1See also McEwan, 2000. Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004, use the PISA dataset for an
heterogeneous group of countries to examine the e⁄ect of private versus public education on
pupils￿achievement and show that private education does not generate systematic bene￿ts.
De Fraja, 2004, reports additional evidence on the UK by Marks and coauthors, who ￿nd that
there is considerable variation in the quality of UK religious - and private - schools: some are
very good but other are very poor. He also quotes evidence by Feinstein and Symons, 1999,
who ￿nd that attendance of private schools does not a⁄ect on average individual performance
2In spite of this evidence, the theoretical literature - to our knowledge - does
not entartain the possibility that private schools can be of lower academic quality
than public schools. An important example is Epple and Romano, 1998, who
model the education market as a strati￿ed hierarchy of school qualities, with
private schools doing systematically better than public schools. Schools in their
model are clubs of students who di⁄er in their academic ability, and school
quality is simply the average quality of enrolled pupils. The essential reason for
the existence of a hierarchy with public schools dominated by private institutions
is that the latter must be of higher peer quality than the former, otherwise no
student would be willing to pay to attend a private school. In their model, state
schools act as residual repositories, taking in all those students who do not enrol
in private schools.
In this paper we question the assumptions that private schools can only
o⁄er quality for a price and that state schools act as residual repositories. First,
private schools can charge a positive price for leisure, access to networks or
for religious education. Second, the assumption that public schools are of the
poorest quality is both not always consistent with the stylized facts, at least
in Europe and in Asia, and not derived from a policy decision rule, be it the
maximization of a social welfare function or a political equilibrium based on
majority voting.
We consider a simpli￿ed market for education with a sequential structure.
In the ￿rst stage of the sequential game, the government decides the quality
standard of the public school, which charges no admission fees. As in Costrell,
1994, quality is higher when the educational standard required to attain the
degree is higher. The decision criterion used by the government is majority
voting. We believe that this is an appealing and intuitive criterion for the US
system of primary and secondary education (see Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995),
where individuals vote on the level of education provision in their district and
in the UK. Finally, Hanushek, 2002, argues that "..it seems natural to believe that Catholic
schools also exhibit wide variation in performance, although none of the existing analyses
document either the magnitude or the potential causes of such di⁄erences." (p.74)
3on the associated local property taxation. We are aware, however, that there
are other possible decision rules, such as welfare maximization (see De Fraja,
2002). Therefore, in the paper we also compare the outcome of majority voting
with the choice by a social planner who maximizes a utilitarian welfare function.
In the second stage, a private school enters the market and chooses both
the positive tuition fee and its own educational standard, which could be above
or below the standard set by the public school. The private school maximizes
pro￿ts by taking into account that its choice of price and standard a⁄ects the
demand for its services. Pro￿t maximization is an assumption used in most of
this literature, see for instance Stiglitz, 1974, and Epple and Romano, 19982.
By restricting entry to a single private school, we focus on the relative quality of
public and private schools at the cost of overlooking the heterogeneity of private
schools. We feel that the treatment of this heterogeneity is important but would
require a separate paper.
We de￿ne an equilibrium in this economy as the combination of the public
and private school educational standards and the nonnegative tuition fee set by
the private school which satisfy both majority voting and pro￿t maximization.
We show that, conditional on the standard chosen by the public school, there
are three possible equilibria: a) public school quality is strictly lower than a
threshold value and the private school selects a higher quality standard; b)
public school quality is above the threshold and the private school selects a
lower quality than the public school; c) non entry by the private school.
While case a) is consistent with Epple and Romano￿ s story, cases b) and
c) are not. In particular, case b) produces a hierarchy with private schools
providing lower quality than public schools. We calibrate the key parameters
of the model by using empirical evidence from the US and ￿nd an interesting
contrast between majority voting and welfare maximization: while the former
selects a public school of low quality and a private school of high quality, the
latter selects the opposite, a public school of better quality than the private
2According to Minter Hoxby, 2000, this assumption ￿ts well Edison and charter schools
in the US. She argues that the key di⁄erence between non-pro￿t and for-pro￿t schools is the
distribution of surplus.
4school. We believe that in the US system this di⁄erence arises because the
majority of voters send their o⁄spring with relatively low ability either to the
public school or to no school at all. For these households, the marginal return
to a higher educational standard in the public school is more than o⁄set by
the higher e⁄ort cost of attaining the standard and by the higher tax burden.
Therefore, they vote for a low quality public school. The social planner, on the
other hand, gives the same weight to all voters, including those of high ability
and low income, who favor a higher educational standard in the public school,
and therefore chooses a higher standard for the public school than the majority
of voters.
The possibility that in equilibrium private schools o⁄er lower quality than
public schools has potentially important implications for education policy. Take
vouchers, for instance. A voucher paid out of taxpayer money by the national
or local government to households enrolling their o⁄spring in private schools
can be justi￿ed on e¢ ciency grounds if these schools provide better quality
to individuals, who could not a⁄ord the price in the absence of the subsidy.
Justi￿cation is harder, however, if the taxpayer￿ s money is spent to ￿nance
vouchers paid out to households who enrol their children in private schools of
low quality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
discusses household demand of private and public education and Section 4 deals
with the behavior of the private school. Next, Section 5 is devoted to majority
voting and Section 6 to the decision taken by the social planner. Calibration is
discussed in Section 7. Conclusions follow.
2 The Model
We consider an economy where high school education is provided either by a
single public school or by the combination of a public and a private school. Entry
by schools is sequential and the timing of the model is as follows: in the ￿rst
stage the government decides the educational standard of the public school;
5in the second stage, a private school decides entry, tuition and educational
standard; in the third and ￿nal stage households enroll their o⁄spring in one of
the available schools.
The government sets up the public school and selects the educational stan-
dard sG 2 [1;2]. As in Costrell, 1994, the standard is the productivity level to
graduate. The underlying idea is that the student￿ s future productivity in the
workplace is "..governed by the cognitive and social skills acquired in school, by
dint of hard work.." (Costrell, 1994, p.958). The higher the standard, the more
substantive the acquired skills and the harder the work required to attain it.
We ￿nd it natural to interpret the educational standard as a measure of school
quality. A higher standard is more costly to the school because it requires better
teachers and facilities such as labs and libraries. Let k 2 [0;1] be the unit cost
of setting the standard sG. This cost is funded by a proportional tax paid by
all households, independently of whether they send their o⁄spring to the public
high school or not. Since attaining the standard requires e⁄ort, and individuals
di⁄er in innate ability, not all the pupils in this economy complete high school3.
The private school decides whether to enter in the market for high school
education and, conditional upon entry, chooses the standard sP and the price p
to maximize (expected) pro￿ts4. Its pro￿t function is
￿ = pD ￿ ksP (1)
where D is expected demand and the unit cost of setting the standard does not
vary with the type of school. Once the educational standard has been set, the
marginal costs of supplying school services are assumed to be zero5. Pro￿ts are
positive in the event of entry and equal to zero in the event of no entry.
Each household in this economy consists of a mother and a daughter. The
household utility function is linear in y 2 [0;1] , the exogenous income of the
3The dropout rate of young Americans - aged 16 to 24 - from high school was 10.9% in
2000.
4Pro￿t maximization is an assumption used in most of this literature, see for instance
Stiglitz, 1974, and Epple and Romano, 1998. According to Minter Hoxby, 2000, this assump-
tion ￿ts well Edison and charter schools in the US. She argues that the key di⁄erence between
non-pro￿t and for-pro￿t schools is the distribution of surplus.
5Positive marginal costs complicate the algebra without providing further insights.
6mother, and concave in w, the earnings of the daughter, a useful simpli￿cation
in line with the relevant literature - see De Fraja, 20026. The mother can
use endowed income y for consumption, to pay income taxes and to fund the
daughter￿ s costs of schooling in the event she enrols in the private school. We
exclude liquidity constraints by assuming that each household can freely borrow
against the future income of the o⁄spring w. The discount factor is equal to 1.
Daughters are heterogeneous and individual di⁄erences are described by the pair
(￿;y) where ￿ 2 [0;1] is an inverse measure of ability, lower for higher ability.
We assume that ￿ and y are independently and uniformly distributed7.
Household utility U is
U = y(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ p + lnw(e;s;￿;y) ￿ ￿s (2)
where e is a dummy equal to 1 if the daughter completes high school and to 0
otherwise8, s = sG;sP ; p is the tuition fee - zero in the public school and positive
in the private school - and ￿s is the e⁄ort cost of attaining the educational
standard s : the higher the standard, the higher the e⁄ort required to attain it,
but the e⁄ort cost is lower the higher is innate ability9.
A key ￿nding of the empirical labor economics literature since Mincer - see
for instance Blackburn and Neumark, 1993, Murnane, Willett and Levy, 1995,
Bowles, Gintis and Osborne, 2001, Altonji and Pierret, 2001, and Hanushek and
Kimko, 2000 - is that earnings are a log-linear function of individual character-
istics, including school quantity and quality. Drawing from this literature, we
specify the daughter￿ s earnings as follows
lnw(e;s;￿;y) = (￿0 + ￿1s)e + ￿2￿ + ￿3y + ￿4X (3)
6In De Fraja the household utility function is concave in the mother￿ s consumption and
linear in the daughter￿ s income.
7This assumption signi￿cantly improves the tractability of the model.
8High school completion is a ticket for college education. While we do not directly consider
college education, we do so indirectly, because graduation from a high quality secondary school
is expected to increase enrolment in a high quality college.
9Linear costs of e⁄ort generate corner solutions for the educational standard. Since we are
mainly interested in the relative standard of the private and public school, this is a useful
simpli￿cation.
7where the constant term ￿0 captures the gains associated to the attained high
school degree, ￿1 is the labor market return to school quality - measured by
the educational standard s - ￿2 and ￿3 are the returns to individual ability
and family income and X is a vector of residual individual characteristics. The
empirical earnings function (3) suggests that the labor market recognizes both
the quantity and the quality of education. Based on the empirical ￿ndings
for the US - reviewed in detail in Section 7 of the paper - we restrict the key
parameters of the earnings function as follows
￿0 2 [0;1] ￿1 2 [0;1] ￿0 + ￿1 < 1 (4)
The sequential structure of the model suggests that we solve it by back-
ward induction. Therefore, we start by characterizing the enrolment decision of
households.
3 Household choice
When high school education is provided by a public and a private school, student
i prefers to enrol in the private school if
Ui(sP) > Ui(sG) (5)
which yields - using (2) and (3) - the following separating condition
￿




If sP > sG, students with ￿i > ￿
￿ - who have lower innate ability - enrol in
the public school and students with ￿i < ￿
￿ - who have high ability - go to the
private school. On the other hand, if sP < sG, students with ￿i > ￿
￿ prefer the
private school and the complementary group goes to the public school.
Independently of whether the private or the public school are selected, enrol-
ment requires that expected utility be higher than the reservation level of utility,
given by
_
U = y(1￿￿)+￿2￿+￿3y+￿4X. This level says that failure to graduate
from upper secondary education reduces both log earnings - by ￿0 + ￿1s - and
the monetary (for the private school) and e⁄ort costs of attaining the degree.
8Condition (6) clari￿es that the private school has no incentive to set the
standard at the same level of the public standard, because with a positive price
it would attract no student. It also shows that household demand for the pri-
vate school depends on whether the latter sets a higher or a lower educational
standard than the public school. There are two regimes and we consider them
in turn.
3.1. Regime 1: entry with a standard higher than sG
Let the standard sP be higher than sG: In this case the separating condition
is (6) and individuals with high ability - or ￿ < ￿
￿ - prefer the private to the
public school. If they do so, they also prefer enrolment to no participation,
because U(sP) > U yields







which always holds for ￿ < ￿
￿. Individuals with lower ability - or ￿ > ￿
￿ - either
enrol in the public school or do not enrol at all. Failure to enrol occurs if




It follows that, with a uniformly distributed random variable ￿; the demand
faced by the private school in this regime is




3.2. Regime 2: entry with a standard lower than sG
Let the standard sP be lower than sG: In this case the separating condition
becomes
￿




9Conditional on the selection of the private school, participation requires
￿ < ￿1 +
￿0 ￿ p
sP












Therefore, the higher the (percentage) di⁄erence in the educational standard
between the public and the private school the higher the tuition fee that the
private school can set and still attract a positive demand for its services10.
4 The choice of the price and the standard by
the private school
Since the distribution of pupils between schools depends on whether the private
school selects a standard higher or lower than sG, we need to distinguish two
separate cases, sP > sG and sP < sG. Consider ￿rst the case sP > sG and let
the pro￿ts of the private school be ￿H = pDH ￿ksP; where DH = ￿1 ￿
p
sP￿sG.


















which implies that the demand for private school services (9) is positive for each
educational standard sP > sG. The optimal price increases in the standard sP
10The condition for no enrolment in this regime is (8), as in the previous regime.
10and decreases in the standard set by the public school. By substituting equation
(14) into condition (12), we get




1 > 4k (16)
The latter condition says that a high quality private school exists only if the
marginal bene￿t of a higher educational standard is signi￿cantly superior to the
marginal cost11.














as the maximum value of sG for
which ￿H > 0 holds: For sG > sG we have ￿H ￿ 0 and no entry12. Whilst




Next consider the case sP < sG and let the pro￿ts of the private school be
￿L = pDL ￿ ksP, where DL = ￿0
sP ￿
psG




















P(sG￿sP) > 0: Therefore the optimal standard in this case
is sP = 1.

















The optimal pro￿t of the private school can be written as
11This condition implies ￿1 > 2k.




















minimum value of sG for which ￿L > 0 holds: When sG < sG, pro￿ts ￿L ￿ 0
and the private school does not enter. The threshold sG exists only if ￿
2
0 > 16k
and in such a case it always belongs to the interval [1;2]. If this condition is
violated, the private school never ￿nds it pro￿table to choose a low educational
standard.
In summary, only when conditions ￿
2
1 > 8k and ￿
2
0 > 16k are both satis￿ed
does the private school have two available options - high or low educational



















1￿8k) > 1; the above condition is stronger than ￿
2
0 > 16k. Therefore
we have
sG > sG if ￿
2












4.1 The choice of the standard above or below sG
We have derived the optimal tuition fee and educational standard of the private
school in two separate regimes, when the standard is respectively higher and
lower than the standard of the public school. Next we determine how the private
school selects the best regime. Noticing that, at the optimal pricing policy, the
pro￿t functions (17) and (19) depend on the standard set by the government
for public schools, sG; we establish the following propositions:
Proposition 1 Suppose that sG < sG: Then there exists a unique value sG <
s￿
G < sG such that the private school chooses a standard below sG for any
sG > s￿
G and a standard above sG for any sG < s￿
G
12Figure 1: Proposition 1
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the intersection of the pro￿t functions ￿H and ￿L when
sG < sG.
Proposition 2 Suppose that sG > sG: Then for sG < sG < sG the private
school always makes negative pro￿ts and refrains from entering the education
market. For sG < sG the private school chooses high quality and for sG > sG it
chooses low quality
Proof. See Appendix
13Figure 2: Proposition 2
Figure 2 illustrates the case of Proposition 2. The two propositions show
that, if the private school enters the education market, it chooses either a higher
or a lower educational standard than the public school. If it chooses a higher
standard, it sets it to the maximum feasible value. If it chooses a lower standard,
it sets it to the minimum feasible value13. In spite of the fact that households
always pay positive tuition fees for private education, only the former case cor-
responds to the hierarchical model of Epple-Romano, 1998, where the public
school is of lower quality than the private school.
13The choice of the extreme values is dictated by the assumption that the costs of attaining
the standard in the individual utility function are linear in the standard.
14The choice of the standard by the private school depends crucially on the
standard selected by the public school. Independently of the selected regime,
private tuition is a function of the distance between the public and the private
standard. Suppose that the government sets a low standard for the public
school. In this case, the private school can charge a high price by choosing
a high educational standard. As the standard in the public school increases,
however, the relative convenience that the private school has of setting a high
standard declines, and after a given threshold - s￿
G - the private school ￿nds it
more pro￿table to switch to a low standard. By so doing, it can increases both
tuition and pro￿ts14.
The type of equilibrium which prevails depends critically on government
choice. The government chooses the educational standard of the public school
by taking into account the subsequent entry of the private school. We turn to
this decision in the next section of the paper.
5 The choice of the standard for the public school:
majority voting
In the previous section we have shown that the private school can choose an
educational standard either above or below the standard selected by the public
school, provided that some restrictions on the relevant parameters hold. In this
section we assume this to be the case. Later on we brie￿ y consider what happens
in the model when the private school can only enter with a high standard (￿
2
0 <
16k) or with a low standard (￿
2
1 < 8k). Furthermore, the characterization of
government choice requires that we distinguish between equilibria when sG < sG
and equilibria when sG > sG. In this section we only examine government
choice when sG < sG, and sketch the case sG > sG, which is very similar, in
the Appendix:
We start by assuming that the public sector budget, which consists only of
14At the optimal price and private standard, the demand for private schools is a constant,
and so is the total cost of setting the standard. Therefore, pro￿ts vary only with private
tuition p.
15educational expenditures and income taxes, is always balanced. This is equiva-
lent to requiring Z 1
0
￿ydy = ksG
which yields, upon integration
￿ = 2ksG (21)
Therefore, a higher educational standard increases the proportional tax rate
paid by all the households in this economy.
We posit that the choice of the public school standard sG is based on majority
voting - as in Stiglitz, 1974, and Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995 - and describe
the outcome of the voting as follows: ￿rst, we select the value of sG preferred
by the majority of households in each of the two regimes - the private school
with lower and higher standard than the public school respectively. Second, we
compare preferred outcomes across regimes and choose the one favored by the
majority of voters.
5.1 Regime 1: high quality public school (sG > s￿
G )
In the regime sG > s￿




Let UP and UG be the utilities of going to the private and public school respec-










< 0 ! sG = s￿
G
for individuals enrolled in the private school. Since the derivative is negative,
households with students in private schools unambiguously prefer the lowest
value of sG in the regime, s￿




> 0 if ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky ! sG = 2
< 0 if ￿ > ￿1 ￿ 2ky ! sG = s￿
G
for individuals enrolled in the public school. More able students, for whom the
derivative is positive, pro￿t from a higher public standard and vote for sG = 2,
and less able individuals, for whom the derivative is negative, gain from a lower
standard, and vote for sG = s￿
G. We establish the following
16Lemma 3 If the group of individuals with ￿ < ￿1￿2ky is the majority, majority
voting yields sG = 2: If the group with ￿ > ￿1 ￿ 2ky is the majority, it chooses
sG = s￿
G.
Proof. See the Appendix
As shown in Figure 4 in the Appendix, the group with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky - area
D in the ￿gure - enrols in the public school and is composed of high ability
individuals, who can attain a high educational standard with relatively low cost
of e⁄ort. While only the very able vote for a high educational standard in the
public school independently of their household income, the not so able and poor
also favor high quality in the public school, because the marginal bene￿t is high
relative to the cost, which is proportional to their low income.
5.2. Regime 2: low quality public school (sG < s￿
G)
In the regime sG < s￿
G, the private school selects sP = 2 and p =
￿1(sP￿sG)
2 .




= ￿2ky + ￿1 > 0 for ￿1 > 4k ! sG = s￿
G




> 0 if ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky ! sG = s￿
G
< 0 if ￿ > ￿1 ￿ 2ky ! sG = 1
for individuals in the public school. We have
Lemma 4 If the group of individuals with ￿ < ￿1￿2ky is the majority, majority
voting yields sG = s￿
G: If the group with ￿ > ￿1 ￿2ky is the majority, it chooses
sG = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix
5.3 The choice between regimes
17In the previous sub-sections we have shown that, if the group with ￿ <
￿1 ￿ 2ky is the majority of the population, the optimal choice is sG = 2 when
sG > s￿
G and sG = s￿
G when sG < s￿
G . We use these results to compare regimes
and establish the following
Proposition 5 If the group with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky is the majority, it chooses the
regime sG > s￿
G and sG = 2. If the majority is with the group ￿ > ￿1 ￿ 2ky, it
votes for sG < s￿
G and sG = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The group with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky is the majority when





i.e. when the size of the group is larger than 50%. This is equivalent to the
following condition




which is satis￿ed when the di⁄erence between the marginal bene￿t of the ed-
ucational standard, ￿1; and the marginal cost, k; is higher than 1
2. Figure 3
shows the combinations of the two parameters for which the private school has
either a lower or a higher educational standard than the public school. Both
areas are above the concave curve ￿
2
1 ￿ 8k = 0. In this portion of the ￿gure,
values of ￿1 above the line ￿1 = 1
2 + k - area A - identify equilibria where the
educational standard of the public school is highest, and values below - area D
- shows equilibria where the private school has the highest standard. The next
sub-section discusses what happens in the areas B and C below the concave
curve.
5.4 The public school standard with no high quality private schools
If the restriction ￿
2
1 > 8k does not hold, a private school with a high educa-









Figure 3: Combinations of ￿1 and k
19is sP = 1 if sG > sG. When sG < sG only the public school remains in the
market. We show in the Appendix that the outcome described by Proposition
5 still holds, with the exception that, when the quality of the public school is
low, there is no private school.
If ￿1 ￿ k > 1
2 - area B in Figure 3 - the voting outcome is sG = 2 (which
implies sP = 1). On the other hand, if ￿1 ￿ k < 1
2 - area C in Figure 3 - then
sG = 1, and there is no private school15.
5.5 The public school standard with no low quality private schools
Finally consider the case when ￿
2
1 > 8k but ￿
2
0 < 16k. Under these con-
ditions the private school ￿nds it pro￿table to enter only by providing a high
standard. Therefore sP = 2 if sG < sG and there is no private school if sG > sG.
The characterization of the public school standard follows the discussion in the
previous sub-section and is brie￿ y sketched in the Appendix. It turns out that,
if the majority condition ￿1 ￿ k > 1
2 holds, the voting outcome is sG = 2; a
school system characterized by an excellent public school with no private school
prevails. Conversely, if ￿1 ￿ k < 1
2, then sG = 1.
6 The choice of the standard for the public school:
the social planner
In the previous section we have applied a "political economy" approach to the
determination of the educational standard of the public school. In this ap-
proach, households vote on the quality of education provision - measured by
the educational standard - and take into account that a higher public quality
needs to be ￿nanced with higher income taxes. While this approach captures
in a broad way the local ￿nance mechanism for the provision of primary and
secondary education in the US, it is not necessarily the appropriate model for
15This is so even when ￿1 ￿ 2k < 0, because the cost of the educational standard in the
public school is too high.
20the rest of the world. In many other countries, education policies are set na-
tionally by the central or regional government, and an alternative approach to
the determination of the educational standard of the public school is that the
government chooses this standard, and income taxes, to maximize a utilitarian
welfare function (De Fraja, 2002).
In this section, we characterize the market for education when the govern-
ment acts as a social planner, and contrast the results with the ￿ndings obtained
from the "political equilibrium" approach. We assume that the welfare function
used by the government is utilitarian - the simple aggregation of the utilities of
all the households in the economy16. Moreover, we limit our attention to the
case sG < sG: As above, we need to distinguish between two regimes, sG > s￿
G
and sG < s￿
G. For each regime, we compute the optimal choice of the educa-
tional standard. Next, we compare optimal choices across regimes and choose
the regime which maximizes the social welfare function.
6.1 Regime 1: the private school sets a low standard
When sG > s￿
G, the private school sets sP = 1 and p =
￿0(sG￿1)
2sG : In this























































The sign of this derivative cannot be determined in an unambiguous way, but
is certainly positive if ￿1 > ￿0. In this special case, the optimal choice of the
16In so doing, the government is assumed to assign zero weight to the pro￿ts of the private
school. Nothing of substance changes if we remove this assumption.
21educational standard is sG = 2. 17
6.2 Regime 2: the private school selects a high stan-
dard
When sG < s￿
G, the private school sets sP = 2 and p =
￿1(2￿sG)
2 , and the




















































which again cannot be unambiguously signed. If ￿1 > 2￿0, however, the sign is
positive and the optimal government choice is s￿
G
18:
In summary, the social planner￿ s choice of the standard depends critically
on the parameters of the earnings function ￿0 and ￿1. Therefore, in the next
section we calibrate these parameters by using micro-econometric evidence from
the US.
7 Calibration
The earnings function (3) postulates that individual earnings increase both in
the quantity of education and in the level of the educational standard. More
education increases individual human capital. A higher standard increases in-
dividual pro￿ciency in cognitive skills, which shows up in higher test scores19.
In a well known study, Murnane, Willett and Levy, 1995, use data from the US
17Since the second derivative is clearly positive, the welfare function is convex in sG, with














19We thank without implicating Eric Hanushek for suggesting this approach.
22High School and Beyond survey and measure accumulated cognitive skills with
the scores in the mathematics test administered in the last year of high school.
They estimate individual earnings functions separately for males and females
and obtain that the marginal return to a year of education is 0:021 for males
and 0:037 for females. They also ￿nd that the marginal return to the test score
is 0:011 for males and 0:017 for females. Since high school lasts three years,
these estimates imply that ￿0 = 0:063 for males and ￿0 = 0:111 for females. To
calibrate ￿1 we need to rescale the test score variable so that it lies between 1
and 2. If we do so, we obtain ￿1 = 0:317 for males and ￿1 = 0:439 for females20.
Interestingly, these estimates are not far from those obtained by Blackburn
and Neumark, 1993, who also use the NLSY and measure cognitive skills with
the results of the ASVAB test. According to our calculations, the values of
￿0 and ￿1 implied by their estimates are 0:093 and 0:318 respectively. Finally,
Altonji and Pierret, 2001, use the AFQT test scores - a subset of the ASVAB
tests - to measure cognitive abilities and estimate an earnings function similar
to (3). It turns out that the values of ￿0 and ￿1 associated to their estimates
are 0:170 and 0:390 respectively.
We take the values of the parameters from the latter study to evaluate the
social planner￿ s choice, and let k take any value which satis￿es sG < sG. Since
￿1 > 2￿0, we conclude that the optimal choice of the educational standard by
the social planner is sG = 2 if sG > s￿
G and s￿
G if sG < s￿
G. Next, we compare the
values of the social welfare function across the two regimes and ￿nd that, when
the parameters assume their calibrated values, WL(sG = 2) > WH(sG = s￿
G),
and sG = 2 is the educational standard which attains the global maximum.
Notice the contrast between the optimal standard selected by the social
planner and the standard selected by majority voting. Since the condition ￿1 ￿
k > 1
2 is violated by the selected con￿guration of parameters, majority voting
produces a system with a low quality public school and a high quality private
school - similar to the one described by Epple and Romano, 1998, in their
20The average test score for males in Murnane￿ s sample is 13.28, with standard error 7.21.
Rescaling this variable in the range [1;2] requires that we multiply the estimated coe¢ cient
of the test score by 28:84.
23discussion of US secondary schools - in spite of the fact that the social planner
would prefer a high quality public school and a private school with a relatively
low education standard.
This di⁄erence arises because the majority of students enrols in the public
school - or drops out - and has relatively lower ability than the minority of
students going to the public and the private school. For the majority of house-
holds, the marginal return to a high educational standard in the public school
is either zero - because their children drop out - or lower than the marginal cost
of attaining and funding the standard. Therefore, they choose a relatively low
standard for the public school. The social planner, on the other hand, gives the
same weight to all voters, including those of high ability and low income, who
favor a higher educational standard in the public school, because their cost of
e⁄ort and their tax burden is relatively low. Hence, she chooses an educational
standard for the public school higher than the standard chosen by the majority
of voters. Consequently, the private school chooses a lower standard than in the
case of majority voting, thereby reinforcing the social planner￿ s choice, because
less able students enrol in the private school, where they face a low educational
standard.
8 Conclusions
When school quality is measured by the educational standard and attaining the
standard requires costly e⁄ort, the market for secondary education needs not
be a hierarchy with private schools o⁄ering better quality than public schools.
An alternative con￿guration, with public schools o⁄ering a higher educational
standard than private schools, can also exist, in spite of the fact that tuition
levied by private schools is strictly positive. In the model presented in this
paper, private schools can o⁄er a lower educational standard at a positive price
because they attract students with a relatively high cost of e⁄ort, who would
￿nd the high standards of the public school excessively demanding. Clearly,
costly e⁄ort is only one possible factor driving this result. Alternatives are that
24private schools provide access to labor market networks, which allow to locate
better jobs more easily because of the connections they a⁄ord, or that they are
"snob" goods, which are consumed because of the reputation they o⁄er (see
Corneo and Jeanne, 1997), even if quality is lower than in the public school.
In either case, the intuition remains the same: by o⁄ering services that are not
strictly related to quality, private schools can charge a positive price, o⁄er lower
quality than public schools and still make positive pro￿ts.
When the educational standard of the public school is chosen by majority
voting, we show that the choice between a con￿guration with high quality public
schools and a con￿guration with high quality private schools depends on the
marginal return to the educational standard relative to the marginal cost of
setting up the standard. If the gap between the two is large enough, a majority
emerges in favor of high quality public schools. We calibrate the model by
using micro-econometric evidence from the US and ￿nd that, based on the
calibrated parameters, majority voting in the US should produce a system with
high quality private schools and low quality public schools, as assumed by Epple
and Romano, 1998. This system, however, does not correspond to the one
preferred by the social planner, and the maximization of a utilitarian welfare
function would deliver a di⁄erent system, with high quality public schools and
low quality private schools.
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279 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First recall that ￿H ￿ 0 for sG > sG and ￿L ￿ 0 for sG < sG. Next de￿ne
￿ = ￿L ￿ ￿H. Clearly, when ￿ > 0 the private school chooses to provide a
quality lower than the public school, and viceversa when ￿ < 0. To study the















> 0 for sG > sG
0 otherwise
Summing up, ￿ = ￿L ￿ ￿H is strictly increasing in sG. Moreover, ￿ < 0 for
sG < sG because ￿L ￿ 0 and ￿H > 0: Symmetrically, ￿ > 0 for sG > sG because
￿L > 0 and ￿H ￿ 0. Therefore, since ￿ is strictly increasing and continuous;
there exists a unique value sG < s￿
G < sG such that for any sG > s￿
G the private
school chooses a standard below sG and for any sG < s￿
G the private school
chooses a standard above sG. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
The derivatives @￿L
@sG and @￿H
@sG are as shown in the proof of Proposition 1. As
above, ￿H ￿ 0 for sG > sG and ￿L ￿ 0 for sG < sG. In this case, however,
the di⁄erence ￿ = ￿L ￿ ￿H is only weakly increasing in sG. First, ￿ < 0 for
sG < sG < sG because ￿L ￿ 0 and ￿H > 0; which makes high quality preferable
by the entrant private school. Second, ￿ > 0 for sG < sG < sG because ￿L > 0
and ￿H ￿ 0; so low quality is preferred. Finally ￿ ￿ 0 for sG < sG < sG
because simultaneously both ￿L ￿ 0 and ￿H ￿ 0. In such a region entry is
never pro￿table:￿
28Proof of Lemma 3
Since individual ability is distributed in the interval [0;1]; as shown in Figure
4; we need to examine in some detail how households vote.
￿ individuals with ￿ 2 [0;￿1 +
p
sG￿sP = ￿1 + ￿0
2sG] - areas C and D in
the ￿gure - choose to enrol in the public school. Therefore, those with
￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky vote for sG = 2, and those with ￿1 ￿ 2ky < ￿ < ￿1 +
p
sG￿sP
vote for sG = s￿
G. Marginal individuals with ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky are indi⁄erent.
As shown in Figure 4, the separating segment ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky completely
belongs to the public school region.




2sG ] - area B in the ￿gure -
prefer the private school and vote for sG = s￿
G: Consider now the individual
￿ = ￿1+
￿0(sG+1)
2sG . Since her utility is equal to y(1￿￿)+￿2￿+￿3y+￿4X,
she is indi⁄erent between participating to upper secondary education and
not participating.
￿ Individuals with ￿ 2 [￿1 +
￿0(sG+1)
2sG ;1] - area A in the ￿gure - do not
participate. Since their utility
_
U = y(1 ￿ 2ksG) + ￿2￿ + ￿3y + ￿4X is
decreasing in sG; they vote for sG = s￿
G:￿
Proof of Lemma 4
As shown in Figure 5, voting occurs as follows:
￿ individuals with ￿ 2 [0;￿1 ￿
p
sP￿sG = ￿1
2 ] - area D in the ￿gure - choose
the private school and votes sG = s￿
G; because their utility is strictly
increasing in sG.
￿ Individuals with ￿ 2 [￿1
2 ;￿1 + ￿0
sG] - areas B and C in the ￿gure - choose
the public school. Those with ￿1
2 < ￿ < ￿1 vote sG = s￿
G, and those
with ￿1 < ￿ < ￿1+ ￿0
sG vote sG = 1. Clearly, the marginal individuals








































Figure 5: A: no participation; B and C: public school; D: private school
￿1 ￿ 2ky completely belongs to the region of people choosing the public
school, as in the previous regime.
￿ Finally, individuals with ￿ 2 [￿1 + ￿0
sG;1] - area A - do non participate to
upper secondary school and vote for the minimum value of sG, i.e. sG = 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
The marginal individuals ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky go to the public school in either
regime and have utility
UG = y(1 ￿ 2ksG) + ￿0 + ￿1sG + ￿2￿ + ￿3y + ￿4X ￿ (￿1 ￿ 2ky)sG
= y + ￿0 + ￿2￿ + ￿3y + ￿4X
31- independent of sG. Consider the individual with ￿ = ￿1￿2ky￿", where " > 0
is small. Her utility is increasing in sG, since
@UG
@sG
= " > 0
Therefore she prefers the regime with sG = 2 to the regime with sG = s￿
G:
The same choice is taken by individuals with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky, who select the
public school in both regimes. When " is large enough, however, we can have
individuals who enrol in the private school if sG < s￿
G and in the public school
if sG > s￿
G. In the private school utility is UP = y + ￿0 + ￿2￿ + ￿3y + ￿4X +




2 ), which is certainly lower than the utility attainable
by going to the public school in the regime sG > s￿
G if ￿
2
1 > 8k, as we have
assumed above21. Therefore, this individual also chooses the latter regime. We
conclude that, if the group with ￿ < ￿1￿2ky is the majority, the optimal choice
is sG = 2.
If the group with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky is not the majority, the regime sG > s￿
G
implies sG = s￿
G and the regime sG < s￿
G implies sG = 1. As above, consider
the individual with ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky + ". Since she is in the public school in both
regimes, her utility is
UG = y(1 ￿ 2ksG) + ￿0 + ￿1sG + ￿2￿ + ￿3y + ￿4X ￿ (￿1 ￿ 2ky + ")sG
which is decreasing in sG, since
@UG
@sG
= ￿" < 0
Therefore she prefers the regime with sG = 1 to the regime with sG = s￿
G: As
in the previous case, the ordering does not change if the individual belongs to
the private school in one regime and to the public school in the other regime.
Therefore, when the group with ￿ > ￿1￿2ky is the majority, the optimal choice
is sG = 1:
The case of no high quality private schools
21Utility in this regime is UG = y + ￿0 + 2" + ￿2sG + ￿3￿ + ￿4X
32As in the previous section we analyze voting in the two regimes and compare
outcomes across regimes. If the public standard is higher than sG; we are back
to Figure 4, with the exception that the critical value s￿
G is now sG. While
individuals with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky vote for sG = 2; the rest vote for sG = sG.
There are two sub-cases: 1) when ￿1 ￿ 2k > 0; the analysis conducted above
still carries on, and the size of the group choosing sG = 2 is ￿1 ￿ k; 2) when
￿1 ￿ 2k < 0; the segment ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky in Figure 4 cuts the horizontal axis
at y = ￿1




4k; lower that 1
2 by
assumption. In this case the majority votes for s￿
G.
When sG is below sG the private school does not enter and individuals can
only choose between the public school and no participation. The corresponding
voting map is as in Figure 5 with the exception that s￿
G is now equal to sG and
that anyone with ￿ < ￿1
2 necessarily chooses the public school. In this case,
individuals with ￿ < ￿1￿2ky vote for sG = sG and the rest vote for sG = 1. As
in the previous regime, we have two sub-cases and the same argument applies,
with the majority choosing either sG = s￿
G or sG = 1.
Suppose ￿rst that the group formed by those with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky is the
majority, and take the near-to-the-marginal individual ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky ￿ ". As
shown in the proof of Proposition 5, her utility is increasing in sG. Hence she
prefers sG = 2: Conversely, if the group formed by those with ￿ > ￿1 ￿ 2ky is
the majority, the corresponding near-to-the marginal individual prefers sG = 1;
and so does the majority.
The case of no low quality private schools
The case with the private school is illustrated in Figure 5 with s￿
G replaced
by sG. The case of no entry by the private school is illustrated in Figure 4 with
the cautionary note that individuals can only choose between a public school
and no school at all. Hence the cuto⁄ point separating the individuals who
participate from the non participating individuals is ￿ = ￿1 + ￿0
sG rather than
￿ = ￿1 +
￿0(sG+1)
2sG :
The group with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky has always size ￿1 ￿ k and chooses sG = sG
33when the private school enters the market and sG = 2 when there is only the
public school. In these cases the group with ￿ > ￿1 ￿ 2ky chooses sG = 1 and
sG = sG respectively. Comparing the two regimes, the near-to-the-marginal
individual ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky ￿ " (belonging to the ￿rst group) prefers sG = 2 (since
her utility is increasing in sG), and the the near-to-the-marginal individual
￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky + " (belonging to the second group) prefers sG = 1. Therefore, if
the majority condition ￿1 ￿ k > 1
2 holds, the voting outcome is sG = 2; and a
school system characterized by an excellent public school with no private schools
prevails. Conversely, if ￿1 ￿ k < 1
2, then sG = 1.
The case sG > sG
The solution of this case closely follows the procedure used in the main text.
We ￿nd it useful to distinguish between three regimes: 1) sG > sG; with the
private school having a low standard; 2) sG < sG; with the private school having
a high standard; and 3) sG < sG < sG , with no entry by the private school.
The ￿rst regime parallels the case sG > s￿
G discussed in the text, provided
that we substitute s￿
G with sG: If the group of individuals with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky is
the majority, the optimal choice is sG = 2, sP = 1 and p = 1
4￿0: If instead the





The second regime parallels the case sG < s￿
G discussed in the text, provided
that we substitute s￿
G with sG: If the group of individuals with ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky
is the majority, the optimal choice is sG = sG, and in equilibrium sP = 2 and
p =
(2￿sG)￿1
2 : If instead the group ￿ > ￿1 ￿ 2ky is the majority, the optimal
choice is sG = 1, and in equilibrium sP = 2 and p = ￿1
2 .
Finally, when sG < sG < sG the private school does not enter and indi-
viduals can only choose between the public school and no participation. The
corresponding voting map is as in Figure 4 in the text, with the exception that
s￿
G is now equal to sG, sG = 1 is replaced by sG = sG and that anyone with
￿ < ￿1
2 necessarily chooses the public school. In this case, individuals with
￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky vote for sG = sG and the rest vote for sG = sG.
34The choice between regimes is determined by the preferences of the near-to-
marginal individuals. Suppose that ￿ < ￿1 ￿ 2ky is the majority and consider
the individual with ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky ￿ ": We have already seen that her utility is
increasing in sG: Hence, when facing the options sG = 2, sG = sG and sG = sG
corresponding to the three regimes, she will prefer sG = 2, as in the "regular"
sG < sG case. Suppose now that ￿ > ￿1 ￿ 2ky is the majority and take the
individual ￿ = ￿1 ￿ 2ky + ", whose utility is decreasing in sG. When facing
the options sG = sG, sG = 1 and sG = sG, she will prefer sG = 1, as in the
"regular" sG < sG case.
Summarizing, the voting outcome does not change when the order of the
pro￿tability thresholds sG and sG is reversed. Moreover, the regime of no entry
is never preferred by the voters.
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